Interview with H.E. Mohammad Haneef Atmar, Minister of Education
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

May 30, 2007

His Excellency Mr. Mohammad H. Atmar was born in Laghman, Afghanistan in 1968. He has a Masters degree in Public Policy, International Relations and Post-war Reconstruction Studies from the University of York, U.K. From 1992 to 1994, Mr. Atmar served as an advisor on humanitarian programs to aid agencies both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He then worked for six years as Programme Manager for the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan. From 2000 to 2002, he worked as Deputy Director General for the International Rescue Committee. In 2002, he was appointed Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development in the Transitional Government. Mr. Atmar is the author of many books including, “Institutional Development of Nongovernmental Organizations in Developing Countries” and “From Rhetoric to Reality.” He has also written numerous analytical articles on humanitarian aid in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Mr. Atmar was sworn in as Minister of Education in May 2006.

How rewarding is your former portfolio, particularly your work as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), in regards to your current roles and responsibilities as Minister of Education?

They are two very different portfolios. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development was actually nonexistent five years ago. It came into existence thanks to a very well-informed policy of the government where development in rural areas was their top priority, or among the top priorities. For that reason, the government increasingly allocated more resources for rural development. The rural development portfolio was basically formulated in terms of national programs that were launched in early 2003, and among the best rural rehabilitation and development programs was the National Solidarity Program, which is now operating in almost 70% of the villages in Afghanistan. It is the first program ever to reach so many villages throughout the country in our history.

To be honest, however, there wasn’t much expectation from that Ministry at the beginning. It was once the Ministry began to produce results and achieve tangible results in villages that people began to talk about the effectiveness of its portfolio.

In contrast, the Ministry of Education has been a functional Ministry for the last 70-80 years. It is a hundred times bigger than the MRRD. The MRRD has around 2,000 staff members whereas the Ministry of Education is in the process of registering its 200,000, or more precisely, its 191,000 staff members. In education, the expectations are high. Everyday we are dealing with over 6 million children in schools. Therefore, if handled properly, this Ministry will have the greatest impact on the lives of people. Afghans are extremely interested in the education of their kids; they see the future and they actually see education as solution to their many problems.

At the same time, the challenges that exist are vast. If the public sees that delivery is not happening, then the amount of public dissatisfaction will be by far the greatest. As such, the irony is that this position has the greatest potential for impact, but it also invites the greatest amount of threat in terms of public opinion related to what the government is actually able to achieve.

The five-year Strategic Plan is a very ambitious program. The cost of education is the price of human rights attained and neglected. How do you envision the ongoing implementation of the plan when international assistance dries up in Afghanistan, and how will you address problems which may potentially arise when one is given the vision of a proper education, but not the tools to actually realize it?

The first issue here is that even the worst regimes in the history of Afghanistan continued to finance education from public resources. The reason for this is that no one can afford to alienate the entire public, though at times the basic right of education was denied to girls, such as during the Taliban regime which had had draconian policies on girls’ education. Therefore, it’s not that education will fall. It won’t. The Afghans will never let it.

If you look at what is happening at the moment, we have around 8,500 schools, formal schools which we are paying for. At the same time, there are roughly about 4,000 schools that we are not paying for, but which the communities finance. This shows that the people of Afghanistan will do everything possible to make sure that their kids are educated. There is no need for concern about the future of our education because once something becomes part of a value system in a society like Afghanistan, it will remain and only grow and develop further.

However, what I might be concerned about is the national and international commitments that both the government of Afghanistan and the international community have made globally and to the people of Afghanistan. Globally, everybody committed themselves to the Millennium Development Goals. In the coming 15 years, we are obliged to make sure that every Afghan child – every girl and boy - has at least taken a primary course or completed a primary course. Afghanistan is a party to this national commitment, as is the rest of the international community. The Afghanistan Compact, a mutually binding document that the government of Afghanistan has committed itself to, is in line with the Millennium Development Goals and advocates that within five years at least 75% of boys and 60% of girls will have been enrolled in our schools. Without international assistance this may not be achievable, and that would disappoint the Afghan public in a big way.

Quality is similarly of concern. It is true that we have made some of the greatest achievements in the education sector in our history. We have never had over 6 million children in our schools; not once in our history. This is the first time that the country has been able to send over half of its school-aged kids to schools. But, quality is important and obviously of concern. Although the number of teachers has been increased sevenfold compared to five years ago, the challenge lies in that, even based on minimal requirements, over 80% of them are not qualified teachers. As such, a challenge is to upgrade the skills, knowledge and basic professional teaching standards of all of our teachers. Similarly, we must increase the number of female teachers. According to mutual obligations, we must increase female teachers by 50% over the coming five years.

The Strategic Plan is a plan to deliver on the Afghanistan Compact and the Millennium Development Goals. It doesn’t define a new mission, but rather, it provides a vision on how to achieve commitments. If international funding ceases, the international community will not be able to deliver on its wider objectives for Afghanistan. We have all agreed – there is a consensus – that security and prosperity in Afghanistan that is democratic, rule bound, and free of terrorism and the menace of nationalities, is in the best interest of everyone, both Afghans and the international community. To achieve this kind of Afghanistan, you need education. Since education is the most central instrument in the hands of the Afghans and the international community, it is not just a simple issue of withdrawing funds from one sector and moving them to another. There is no option, so international donors must also be seriously engaged in this.

What is the pay system for teachers, and how are pay rates and skill development for teachers being pursued?

This issue is the most complicated, but I am working to simplify it as much as possible. To do so, I must first address whether or not we are adequately paying our teachers. It is clear that we are not; on average a teacher earns around $60 a month, which compared with employment in other sectors, is not a great pay. Next I must ask, “Is there a need to increase teacher’s salaries?” The answer is definitely, “yes.” Finally is the issue of can we, as a government, afford to increase salaries? My response to this is not unless certain things are arranged and a conscious policy decision is made.

Even with the current levels of pay, Afghanistan is literally asking for 50% of its operating budget from the donors and 50% of our recurrent budget of the government that is financed through donors’ grants. Donors are reluctant to allow the government of Afghanistan to raise salaries because the people on our payroll – the Ministry of Education – account for nearly 60% of the entire civil service. Donors’ argument is that an increase of 60% will in reality be a 100% increase because you can’t just ignore the other 40%. Therefore, it means that the government will have to increase the salaries of all civil servants, which it can’t because it lacks the resources, the domestic sources, to do so. This is why we have agreed with the international community on a new plan, a plan about a pay and grade reform that is currently being reviewed for approval by the President. The plan looks at a number of issues, predominantly, to reform the grading system in the civil service. This is linked to a significant reform in the organization, functions, structure and recruitment procedures, which will have to be more transparent and competitive. Once these reforms and measures are in place and they have been successfully undertaken, then salaries can be increased. The minimum salary will be $80 a month and maximum $800 a month. To summarize, we are indeed working on the increasing of salaries, but our success is dependent on two factors – significant reform in the processes and salary increases that are linear to the skill improvement of teachers. Pay raises will not be across the board, so as to also be an incentive for people to upgrade their skills.

What is the current state of the hiring process?

We have made some changes. We have decentralized the recruitment process and now teachers are being recruited in the provinces, from the provinces through a competitive and transparent process. This year we are recruiting around 10,000 new teachers, and just before leaving for Japan, I authorized a recruitment process to be conducted in the provinces.

If you were to name three priority programs of the eight specified in the National Strategic Education Plan, what would they be and what are the benchmarks for implementing them?

This is a very difficult question. It is as if you are asking a parent as to which one of the eight children he would prioritize – or choose over another – and this is not possible.

These eight themes are the key pillars of the education system in Afghanistan. For example, you cannot prioritize gender education over literacy. It is true that our kids need to be taught in our schools, but what about their parents, their illiterate parents? Can we say that educating of kids is more important than educating their parents?

Another case in point: gender education is fine, literacy is fine, but what about technical skills of the people? It is technical and vocational education which Afghanistan so badly needs. At the moment, our problem is that we may perhaps be one of the most politically educated populations in the world. The reason for this is because we could survive only by being so – by analyzing the politics of our country and that of the regions affecting our lives. However, technically we are the most uneducated nation. Exactly for this reason, even for basic skilled labor requirements, we have to bring people in from outside the country. I can say that technical and vocational education is definitely the means to achieving a more skilled workforce in the country.

Similarly, curriculum development is critical. You can’t have any of these education programs without robust curriculum development, another of the eight programs. Even with teachers and buildings, you can’t do much without books. This is directly related to another top priority program which is the infrastructure of education, especially the school building, desks and chairs that make up the supply side issue in the country. Finally, all these services must be delivered to the population. What about the institution itself that is actually suppose to deliver these services, i.e. the Ministry of Education? Does it have the capacity do deliver that sort of service efficiently and effectively? The answer is “no, it doesn’t.” Therefore, our final program of the eight is the institutional reform and development of the Ministry so that it becomes a valued institution in the education sector.

Still, to answer this question in a different, more concise way, there are things that we can prioritize within the eight programs. Each program and its sub-programs have hundreds of other priorities. Among these, we can prioritize and make selections based on resource availability and the capacity for implementation. This is possible. But, to ignore any of the eight areas would make our education package incomplete.

In your view, how much of a role has Japan played toward the progress and/or development of education in Afghanistan, and in which areas of education in Afghanistan do you expect Japan to help more in the future?

Japan has been a significant partner in the education sector as well in other sectors of investment. We have been lucky to have Japan as our partner in this redevelopment process. However, given the lack of and constraints on their resources, Japan has not been a big player in the education sector. It has been a consistent and committed player, but not a big player compared to the World Bank, the US Government, NATO and a couple other donors. We are very much appreciative of the help that Japan have given us so far, and I’ve made this trip to basically convey two specific messages. Firstly, to express my appreciation for what Japan has done for Afghanistan and secondly, to send an invitation for a different type of partnership with Japan on education. We have committed ourselves to education goals nationally and internationally. However, we cannot achieve them in one year or two. At minimum it will take about five years and at maximum – in terms of delivery of the Millennium Development Goals in particular – it will take 15 years. I’ve come here to ask my Japanese colleagues whether or not they are going to be my partner for the duration. Without such a partnership – a dedicated partner with a predictable resource mobilization and dispersement plan – we will not be able to achieve those Goals. Based on the five-year Education Strategy, this is the first time ever in our history that the government has had a plan for primary and secondary education, so this should now be the basis for international partnership with Afghanistan. We would like Japan to look at the whole of our plan with a long-term perspective and with predictable resources. Of course, if Japan so wishes, we could look at prioritizing some of the areas of the eight programs, such as technical and vocation education due to Japan’s strong track record in this area. Literacy could be prioritized next, followed by infrastructure since all too often donors tend to go for the soft part of the education rather than the hardware.

Why were so many schools in Badakhshan closed and why are such efforts being taken now to reopen these schools? Could you please elaborate on your trip there while also addressing your thoughts regarding regional programs that do not coincide with the National Education Plan?

There is actually a misunderstanding here. There has been no school closed in Badakhshan. What is happening is that out of the 8,500 schools in Afghanistan, roughly 500 are formal schools, where students receive a formal certificate upon graduation. In those schools, there are around 9,000 teachers and non-teaching staff that are paid by the government. As I said earlier, in addition to these schools, people – on their own initiative – have set up schools for their kids, which we honor and are very much grateful for. In Badakhshan, there are about 169 of such schools and for the last couple of years people and communities, legitimately, have been expecting the government to formalize these schools. However, because of budgetary constraints, the government was not able to pay teachers at the informal schools since they were considered to be community-based school teachers, to be paid by the community. Honestly, I’m against this policy where teachers are paid by the communities because it does not really work in Afghanistan. Teachers have to be paid by the government. Communities can contribute in other ways such as the building of schools and other things.

In our plan for the new year, we will be recruiting around 10,000 teachers. In Badakhshan there are approximately 2,500 teachers in the 169 schools, and they are expecting basically that we include them on the payroll. We have communicated to them that this has to be performed in a phased manner because I simply cannot take 25% of the national allocation and give it to a single province. According to the Constitution, we are suppose to provide a fair distribution of resources to the different provinces and make sure that education, growth and expansion in these provinces is even-handed. So, the issue in Badakhshan was that this disappointed some teachers and then they went on strike, demanding that they be included on the payroll immediately. One of the greatest challenges of education is that everyday teachers are ready to go on strike.

It is quite complicated, and therefore everyone got the wrong version of the situation. The truth, as I went there myself with a special team to look into the issue, is that we are working on it. Yesterday, I received a report which noted that in another two or three days the analysis will be concluded. Then, all of the facts and numbers would be evaluated. The situation is not as bad as it looks. We have already found one solution, but we need to implement it the right way. It should not come as an ad-hock solution to the problem. It should be consistent with the structural policies of the Ministry. So indeed, no school has been closed in Badakhshan and no teacher has been fired – it is only the fact that there are teachers that have been paid by communities and they would now like to be transferred to the government payroll as formal teachers, with which the government has a constraint so we are working on finding an ideal solution.

The beauty of democracy is that people can now speak out; they can demand accountability from the government. The complication however, is that sometimes that can be manipulated politically or by uninformed people who have other agenda. In any case, what we are trying to do is not to be driven by political objectives. It is imperative that Afghans value the education of their kids and we have to provide that in a fair and transparent, efficient and effective manner.